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1. Introduction
Many empirical studies in corporate finance use dynamic panel data models to investigate
the dynamic behavior of a financial policy of interest. In the corporate payout literature, several
studies have examined the degree of dividend smoothing by estimating Lintner’s (1956) partial
adjustment model (e.g., Brav et al., 2005; Skinner, 2008; Andres et al., 2009). In the capital
structure literature, researchers have used this dynamic model extensively to study how quickly
firms adjust toward their long-run target leverage ratios.1 The use of dynamic panels is also
common in other areas of corporate finance.2
Despite the growing popularity of dynamic panel data models, they are difficult to estimate
due to the likely presence of firm fixed effects and several complexities in empirical corporate
finance, such as unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity, residual serial correlation, and the
fractional nature of the dependent variable. To begin with, due to the correlation between the
fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable, the pooled OLS (hereafter POLS) estimator is
biased and inconsistent. The fixed-effects (hereafter FE) method also estimates these models
with a finite-sample bias (Nickell, 1981). Previous simulation results (e.g., Judson and Owen,
1999) suggest that this bias is likely to be substantial for corporate finance studies, which typ-
ically analyze annual company data over a relatively short period. The econometrics literature
has advanced two main approaches to deal with this bias. The first involves using instruments
for the lagged dependent variable, and comprises five methods: the just-identified instrumental
variable estimator (hereafter AH-IV) (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981), the first-difference general-
ized methods of moments estimator (hereafter FD-GMM) (Arellano and Bond, 1991), the sys-
temGMMestimator (hereafter SYS-GMM) (Blundell and Bond, 1998), and the long-difference
GMM estimator (hereafter LD-GMM or LDP-GMM, depending on long-difference parameters
used) (Hahn et al., 2007; Huang and Ritter, 2009). The second approach, consisting of three es-
timators, corrects for the estimation bias either analytically, or by simulation. Specifically, these
1See Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Ozkan (2001), de Miguel and Pindado (2001), Fama and French (2002),
Flannery and Rangan (2006), Kayhan and Titman (2007), Antoniou et al. (2008), Lemmon et al. (2008), Byoun
(2008), Huang and Ritter (2009), Öztekin and Flannery (2012), Faulkender et al. (2012), and Warr et al. (2012).
2See, for example, studies of cash holdings by Opler et al. (1999), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), and Bates et al.
(2009), studies of corporate investment by Aivazian et al. (2005a,b), studies of debt maturity by Ozkan (2000) and
Antoniou et al. (2006), and studies of corporate governance by Wintoki et al. (2012).
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estimators either develop bias correction formulas in the (fixed-effects) least-squares dummy
variable model (hereafter LSDVC) (Kiviet, 1995; Bruno, 2005), or approximate the bias func-
tion and search for unbiased estimates using an iterative bootstrap-based correction procedure
(hereafter BC) (Everaert and Pozzi, 2007), or a simulation-based indirect inference method
(hereafter II) (e.g., Gouriéroux et al., 2010). Although these advanced methods should, in the-
ory, reduce the POLS and FE bias, little is known about their performance in the presence of
the complex issues listed above. In what follows, we briefly discuss the possible sources of
those issues and their effects on the IV/GMM and bias-corrected estimators.
First, unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity, caused by non-zero correlation between
the firm fixed effects and a regressor, is a common problem in corporate research (Roberts and
Whited, 2011; Wintoki et al., 2012). This problem may affect the performance of the estimators
that assume the strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables. The second issue is the likely
presence of residual autocorrelation, which violates one of the most important assumptions of
the IV/GMM estimators, and renders their instruments invalid (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In
empirical corporate research, serial correlation may be caused by the persistence of the financial
variable (Lemmon et al., 2008), the presence of measurement errors (Welch, 2011; Roberts
and Whited, 2011), or the use of an incorrect functional form (e.g., non-linear versus linear
models).3 The third problem concerns the measurement of the dependent financial variable.
The financial policy variable under consideration (e.g., leverage or debt maturity) can be a
ratio bounded by the unit interval [0,1]. Since the IV/GMM and bias-corrected approaches
listed above were originally developed for continuous, unbounded dependent variables, their
properties may be affected if the dependent variable is fractional (Loudermilk, 2007).
In this paper, we examine which of the existing estimators are most appropriate and ro-
bust for dynamic panels in empirical corporate finance, especially in the likely presence of
unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation, and fractional dependent variables. As mentioned
above, we consider five IV/GMM estimators, AH-IV, FD-, SYS-, LD-, and LDP-GMM, as
well as three bias-corrected estimators, LSDVC, BC, and II. We also examine an augmented
3There is evidence of residual autocorrelation in empirical research. The results of our studies on capital
structure and cash holdings confirm that the test for no serial correlation is frequently rejected.
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doubly-censored Tobit estimator (termed DPF by Elsas and Florysiak, 2014) that accounts for
the fractional nature of the dependent variable (Loudermilk, 2007). We conduct Monte Carlo
simulation studies and empirical applications in order to examine the performance of these
estimators.
Our simulation studies show that the bias-corrected estimators, LSDVC, BC, and II, are
generally the most appropriate and robust methods for dynamic panel data models in empirical
corporate finance. These estimators estimate the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable
(i.e., the autoregressive coefficient) and those on the explanatory variables with the most accu-
racy and efficiency. Among the three, BC performs well in regressions with residual autocorre-
lation and in specifications with high lag orders. In a special case where the dependent variable
is a ratio, censored at 0 and 1, LSDVC, BC, and II may still provide reasonable estimates with
a moderate amount of bias, although, at a high percentage of censoring (e.g., more than 20%),
DPF emerges as the most robust method.
Our results further suggest that the IV/GMM estimators are outperformed by the bias-
corrected methods. The IV/GMM estimates, especially those for the autoregressive coefficient,
tend to be unreliable in most of our simulation experiments. Crucially, these methods are very
sensitive to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and serially correlated errors where their
instruments become invalid. There are only a few conditions under which these methods would
be useful. For example, SYS-GMM could be used for regressions without unobserved hetero-
geneity, endogeneity, and autocorrelation. In empirical research, however, these conditions are
rather restrictive and unlikely to be met. In short, our paper highlights the potential drawbacks
of using the IV/GMM estimators in empirical corporate finance.
We verify our simulation results using two empirical applications to dynamic capital struc-
ture and cash holdings. In the first application, the dependent variable, leverage, is a ratio
bounded by the unit interval, while, in the second, the dependent variable, cash holdings, is
measured by the natural logarithm of the cash-to-net-assets ratio, i.e., a continuous, unbounded
variable. In these applications, one of our main objectives is to estimate the speeds with which
firms adjust toward their target leverage and cash holdings, respectively. We find that LSDVC,
BC, and II produce the most plausible estimates of the speeds of dynamic leverage and cash
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adjustments, as well as the most reasonable coefficients on the explanatory variables, consis-
tent with prior theoretical predictions. In the leverage application, these bias-corrected methods
obtain similar speeds of leverage adjustment, ranging between 24% and 28%. DPF, the only
method that explicitly accounts for the fractional nature of leverage, yields a similar estimate
of 27%. The estimates obtained using FD-, SYS-, and LD-GMM vary between 15% and 18%,
putting them very close to the (biased) POLS estimate; these estimates are unreliable because
their fundamental assumptions of instrument validity and no autocorrelation are both violated
according to our diagnostic tests. In the cash application, we find similar results regarding
the performance of the estimators: LSDVC, BC, and II again produce similar estimates of the
speed of cash adjustment, at 48-49%.
Our study is related to previous simulation studies in the econometrics literature (Kiviet,
1995; Judson and Owen, 1999; Bun and Kiviet, 2003; Bruno, 2005; Bun and Carree, 2006; Ev-
eraert and Pozzi, 2007). Our simulations maintain the rigor of these studies in terms of properly
controlling for two key parameters in dynamic panel data models, namely the magnitude of the
fixed effects relative to that of the idiosyncratic error (i.e., the loading factor) and the explana-
tory power of the regressors relative to that of the disturbances (i.e., the signal-to-noise ratio).4
However, we extend these general simulation studies by considering issues relevant to empiri-
cal corporate finance. We use data-generating processes that mimic actual company panel data
and, moreover, explicitly allow for unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, and residual serial
correlation. We also conduct additional simulation experiments to examine the properties of the
alternative econometric methods when the dependent financial variable of interest is fractional
and bounded by the unit interval. Hence, our findings and conclusions are directly applicable
to empirical research in corporate finance.
Finally, our study is related to a recent simulation study by Flannery and Hankins (2013,
hereafter FH).5 However, our study differs from, and improves on, their analysis in many im-
4In empirical capital structure research, Lemmon et al. (2008) show that the variation in leverage is mainly
explained by the firm fixed effects (60%), as opposed to the independent variables (18%). Hence, it is important
to examine the impact of the relative magnitude of the fixed effects on the properties of the estimators.
5In a contemporaneous study, Zhou et al. (2014) examine a method of (linear) bias correction for the estimate
of the speed of adjustment (SOA) in dynamic capital structure models. They further propose a global minimum
variance (GMV) combined estimator to approximate a consensus SOA estimate, which is a GMV-weighted av-
erage of the (bias-corrected) estimates obtained using six popular baseline estimators, including OLS, FE, FD-,
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portant respects. First, our benchmark experiment explicitly controls for the loading factor and
the signal-to-noise ratio, two fundamental control parameters in dynamic panel data models
(Kiviet, 1995). Under a more rigorous simulation design, we show that the IV/GMM estima-
tors are sensitive to the control parameters and perform less well than in FH’s simulations.
Second, while FH only examine a bias-corrected estimator based on an analytical approach
(LSDVC), we further consider two recently developed bias correction methods based on itera-
tive sampling algorithms, namely BC and II. Compared to LSDVC, these methods rely on less
restrictive assumptions, and are computationally less demanding, especially in the case of BC.
We find that both perform well with BC being least affected by autocorrelation. Third, we com-
pare the IV/GMM and bias-corrected estimators with DPF in an important simulation exercise
allowing for the fractional nature of the dependent variable (Loudermilk, 2007; Elsas and Flo-
rysiak, 2014). Inconsistent with FH’s conjecture, we show the non-negligible effect of severe
censoring and the relevance of DPF in this case. Fourth, while FH conclude that LSDVC and
SYS-GMM are the most appropriate methods, we observe poor performance from SYS-GMM
and the related IV/GMM estimators (especially in the presence of autocorrelation). We, thus,
caution against the use of these methods and recommend the more robust bias-corrected esti-
mators. Finally, we are able to corroborate our simulation results using empirical applications
to two highly relevant areas of corporate finance, capital structure and cash holdings. In sum,
our study provides new simulation and empirical results with general and relevant implications
for future empirical corporate research.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the motivation
for using dynamic panel data models in empirical corporate finance and review the existing
methods for estimating such models. In Section 3, we conduct Monte Carlo simulation studies
in order to examine the properties of these estimators. In Section 4, we conduct two empirical
applications, on dynamic capital structure and cash holdings. Section 5 concludes.
SYS-, LD-GMM, and LSDVC. This pooled estimation approach is, however, different from ours, which is to eval-
uate the relative performance of single estimation methods. Further, it mainly focuses on reducing the bias in the
autoregressive coefficient (i.e., the SOA) and does not consider three recently developed bias-corrected estimators,
namely BC, II, and DPF.
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2. Dynamic panel data models in empirical corporate finance
2.1. Model specifications
Empirical studies in corporate finance often examine the dynamics of financial policy vari-
ables through the estimation of dynamic panel data models. In such models, the lagged depen-
dent (financial) variables are included as regressors to capture firms’ adjustments toward their
optimal financial policies or the degree of persistence in the policies. In particular, in studies
on capital structure, cash holdings, and dividends, many researchers employ a dynamic partial
adjustment model to study firms’ target adjustment behavior (refer to the studies cited in the
Introduction for further details). Formally, this model is specified as:
∆yit = δ (y
∗
it− yi,t−1)+ηi+ vit , (1)
where yit and y∗it denote the actual and optimal financial policies for firm i at time t, respectively.
ηi is the (unobserved) time-invariant fixed effect, and vit is the idiosyncratic error term.
In the dynamic model (1), a firm adjusts partially toward its optimal financial policy due to
the presence of positive adjustment costs. The speed of adjustment (hereafter SOA), δ , should
vary between 0 and 1, with a higher δ indicating a more rapid adjustment. Although the optimal
financial policy, y∗it , is not directly observed, it is typically modeled as a function of some firm-
specific characteristics, i.e., y∗it = θ
′xit ,where xit denotes a k×1 vector of explanatory variables.
In estimating (1), most corporate finance studies adopt a one-stage procedure (e.g., Flannery
and Rangan, 2006; Antoniou et al., 2008), which involves substituting y∗it = θ
′xit into (1) to
yield the following model:
yit = γyi,t−1+β
′
xit +ηi+ vit , (2)
where γ = 1− δ and β = δθ . Researchers using the dynamic model (2) are able to simulta-
neously estimate the autoregressive coefficient, γ, and the long-run relationships between the
optimal financial policy and the determining factors in equilibrium, θ (i.e., the long-run coef-
ficients) (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2008). The majority of the empirical research estimating (2) is
interested in the autoregressive coefficient, γ , or alternatively the adjustment speed, δ (= 1−γ),
because these coefficients shed light on the important questions of (i) how quickly firms adjust
toward their optimal financial policies and (ii) how sticky the policies are.
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2.2. Alternative estimators for dynamic panel data models
2.2.1. Least-squares and fixed-effects estimators
The pooled OLS (POLS) and fixed-effects (FE) estimators are not appropriate for estimat-
ing the dynamic model (2). Applying POLS to (2) produces biased and inconsistent estimates
because the lagged dependent variable, yi,t−1, is correlated with the firm fixed effect, ηi, i.e.,
E [yi,t−1ηi] 6= 0. It is well established that POLS tends to overestimate the autoregressive co-
efficient, γ , and underestimate the SOA (Baltagi, 2008). To deal with this bias, several studies
turn to the FE estimator, which eliminates the fixed effects through the within-group transfor-
mation. Nevertheless, for a fixed T , FE is biased because the error term is correlated with the
lagged dependent variable in the transformed equation. Specifically, FE underestimates the au-
toregressive coefficient, γ , and overestimates the SOA (Nickell, 1981). Most corporate studies
that estimate dynamic models with FE are subject to this bias because they typically examine
annual company data covering a short time period.
2.2.2. Instrumental variable (IV) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators
To deal with the finite-sample bias of the FE estimator, corporate finance researchers have
turned to advanced methods developed in the panel data literature. The earliest of such methods
is based on Anderson and Hsiao’s (1981, 1982) instrumental variable approach (AH-IV), which
removes the fixed effects via the first-difference transformation of (2):
∆yit = γ∆yi,t−1+β
′
∆xit +∆vit , i= 1, . . . ,N; t = 3, . . . ,T. (3)
This method employs yi,t−2 (or ∆yi,t−2) as the only instrument for ∆yi,t−1 in (3). The main
limitation of this just-identified estimator is a lack of efficiency due to the ignoring of additional
valid instruments.
To address this lack of efficiency, researchers have considered using longer lagged depen-
dent variables as additional instruments. This approach involves employing the generalized
method of moments (GMM) to deal with the over-identification problem resulting from the
use of those additional instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991) propose the first-difference
GMM estimator (FD-GMM), which considers the moment conditions, E [yi,t−s∆vit ] = 0, with
t = 3, . . . ,T and s = 2, . . . , t − 1, and uses a vector (yi1, . . . ,yi,t−2) as the GMM instruments
for ∆yi,t−1 in the first-differenced equations (3). Blundell and Bond (1998) further develop the
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system GMM estimator (SYS-GMM), which improves the efficiency of FD-GMM by utilizing
additional moment conditions in the level equations (2). It considers (∆yi,2, . . . ,∆yi,t−1) as in-
struments for yi,t−1 under the following moment conditions: E [∆yi,t−svit ] = 0 for t = 3, . . . ,T ,
and s= 1, . . . , t−2 (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).
Hahn et al. (2007) propose the long-difference estimator (LD-GMM) to address the weak
instruments problem typically associated with the above GMM estimators. This method relies
on a smaller set of moment conditions and involves taking the difference between the first and
last observations in (2). The long-differenced equation is then estimated by a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) in which (yi,T−1−yi1) is instrumented by yi1. Next, the residuals from this step
are used as additional IVs in the next regression. A number of iterations (at least three) are
often required to ensure that the parameters can be estimated efficiently (Hahn et al., 2007).
Huang and Ritter (2009) propose a modified version of the LD-GMM estimator for unbalanced
panels (LDP-GMM) by specifying a shorter differencing parameter, k = 4.
Note that the IV/GMM approaches are based on the assumption of no residual autocorrela-
tion, i.e., E [vitvis] = 0 ∀ t 6= s. The GMM estimators further require valid, optimal instruments
to be chosen. In theory, both of these conditions can be evaluated by using the AR(2) and
Sargan tests (Arellano and Bond, 1991).6
2.2.3. Bias-corrected estimators
Recent research has followed another route to correct for the bias of FE. Kiviet (1995) de-
velops a bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable estimator (LSDVC), which performs an
analytical correction of the FE bias. Kiviet (1999), Bun and Kiviet (2003), Bruno (2005), and
Bun and Carree (2006) extend this estimator to cases with heteroskedasticity and unbalanced
panels.7 Although simulation studies show that LSDVC can outperform IV/GMM estimators
for balanced panels of all lengths (Judson and Owen, 1999), this method has two potential
drawbacks. First, it relies on a strong assumption that the true model is an AR(1) model.
Second, this approach faces a severe computational challenge due to non-trivial matrix manip-
6Note, however, that the Sargan test is severely under-sized and has extremely low power in long panels
(Bowsher, 2002).
7To approximate the finite-sample bias, an initial matrix of coefficient starting values must be specified (e.g.,
the FD-GMM’s or SYS-GMM’s initial estimates). See, for example, Bruno (2005).
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ulations being required in the bias-correction formulas. To date, only a few studies in empirical
corporate finance have used LSDVC (Öztekin and Flannery, 2012; Wintoki et al., 2012).
Everaert and Pozzi (2007) develop a bias-corrected FE estimator (BC) based on an itera-
tive bootstrap that simulates the distribution of the FE estimator using the original (biased) FE
estimates. This method then corrects the bias iteratively until unbiased estimates of the true pa-
rameters are found; see our Internet Appendix for details of the estimation algorithm. BC has a
number of advantages over the above approaches to bias reduction. First, unlike the IV/GMM
estimators, it does not require the specification of optimal, valid instruments, on which the prop-
erties of the IV/GMM estimators crucially depend. Second, compared to analytical approaches
(e.g., LSDVC), BC performs a bias correction by means of non-parametric bootstrapping and
as a result does not rely on restrictive parametric distributional assumptions. In practice, BC is
computationally less demanding than LSDVC. Everaert and Pozzi (2007) demonstrate that BC
outperforms GMM in terms of bias reduction and efficiency, while yielding better inferences
than LSDVC in short panels. However, to the best of our knowledge, this method has not yet
been applied in corporate finance research.
Recently, Gouriéroux et al. (2010) have proposed another approach to bias correction using
the technique of indirect inference (II) (see also Smith, 1993; Gouriéroux et al., 1993, 2000).8
Similar to the bootstrap procedure above, this method also involves simulating data iteratively,
estimating the model to approximate the bias function, and searching for unbiased estimates
using the inverse function of the bias. One immediate advantage of II is that it does not rely
on an explicit form for the bias function but calibrates it via simulation. Thus, similar to BC,
this method is computationally less involved and more feasible than LSDVC, which requires
explicit, and often complex, analytic derivations of the bias function or its expansion. Com-
pared to BC, however, II is, at least in theory, a more general and versatile approach applicable
to different model specifications and estimation methods, including both FE and IV/GMM es-
timators.9 Further, the II procedure can be implemented in conjunction with an appropriate
8We are extremely grateful to the Associate Editor and the reviewers for encouraging us to follow this line of
inquiry.
9In principle, this technique can also be applied to non-linear dynamic panel data models proposed by Dang et
al. (2012).
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baseline estimator to take advantage of some of its useful properties. Gouriéroux et al. (2010),
for example, propose to use an MLE method such as FE as the baseline estimator because it has
a small variance, meaning that only a small number of simulated paths is required to ensure an
accurate calibration of the bias function. The authors show via simulations that this II method
is highly effective in the univariate autoregressive panel data model. We adopt the same ap-
proach in our simulation and empirical studies below; see our Internet Appendix for details of
the estimation algorithm.10
3. Monte Carlo simulation studies
We now perform Monte Carlo simulation studies to investigate the finite-sample perfor-
mance of the estimators. Our simulation design draws on previous simulations in the panel
data literature (Kiviet, 1995; Judson and Owen, 1999; Bun and Kiviet, 2003; Bruno, 2005; Bun
and Carree, 2006; Everaert and Pozzi, 2007), with several important extensions catered to cor-
porate finance research. First, unlike those studies, we specify the key simulation parameters
based on actual company data. Thus, while our simulations maintain the rigor of those studies,
our findings and conclusions are directly applicable to empirical corporate finance.
Second, we explicitly account for unobservable heterogeneity in which an explanatory vari-
able and the unobserved fixed effects are correlated. In empirical corporate finance, this prob-
lem is common: an explanatory variable determining the financial policy variable may proxy
for both observed and unobserved factors, the latter being correlated with the fixed effects
(Roberts and Whited, 2011). In dynamic cash models (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009),
for example, leverage, typically included as an explanatory variable, is potentially endogenous
thanks to its likely correlation with the fixed effects. In studies on the relation between board
structure and firm performance, the fixed effects affect firm performance but are also corre-
lated with board structure, an explanatory variable in the performance equation (Wintoki et al.,
2012).
10While theoretically II can be applied to the IV/GMM estimators, in practice, it is likely to be computationally
demanding, especially in models with a large number of regressors. In our simulation analysis (unreported), we
have implemented an II procedure using FD-GMM as the baseline estimator. We find that this approach does
not outperform the II procedure using FE as the baseline estimator described above, while facing a significant
computational burden.
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Third, we also investigate the impact of (unaccommodated) residual serial correlation on
the relative performance of the estimators. This analysis is important because both FH and our
empirical analysis in Section 4 reveal that second-order autocorrelation is a potential problem
in Compustat company data, one that can violate the validity of moment conditions underlying
the IV/GMM estimators.
3.1. Data generating processes and simulation design
We consider the following data-generating process (hereafter, DGP):
yit = γyi,t−1+βxit +ηi+ vit , i= 1, . . . ,N; t = 2, . . . ,T, (4)
where both xit and vit follow an AR(1) process:
xit = ρxi,t−1+ξit , (5)
vit = φvi,t−1+ εit , (6)








, and they are distributed independently of each other.11
Throughout our simulation experiments, we specify γ = 0.8, β = 0.2, ρ = 0.5, and σv = 1.
Our choice of γ = 0.8 is guided by existing studies in both corporate finance and econometrics.
Empirically, the choice of the parameter value γ = 0.8 (and the corresponding SOA, δ = 0.2)
is in line with the SOA estimated in recent corporate finance studies, especially those in the
capital structure literature (Lemmon et al., 2008; Huang and Ritter, 2009). Previous Monte
Carlo simulations typically consider the important case where the dependent variable is highly
persistent, with γ = 0.8, i.e., where the finite-sample bias is more pronounced, thus greatly
affecting the performance of the estimators (Kiviet, 1995; Judson and Owen, 1999; Bruno,
2005).12 Next, we choose β = 1− γ so that a change in γ only affects the short-run dynamics
and not the long-run relationship, which is normalized to unity, i.e., θ ≡ β/(1− γ) = 1. Our
choice of ρ = 0.5 is reasonable given the range (0.085–0.844) of the AR(1) coefficient estimates
for Compustat explanatory variables reported in Table 2 of FH.
11Unlike FH’s simulations, we do not consider the case with several regressors because we are more interested
in the conditional distribution of the dependent variable than the unconditional joint distribution of the regressors.
A minor advantage of considering multiple regressors is that it helps to account for multicollinearity among the
regressors. However, provided that the underlying specification is correct, multicollinearity does not affect the
bias in the estimates, but simply leads to larger standard errors.
12In unreported simulations, we examine another case where γ = 0.2 and find that, as γ decreases, the estimators
(except POLS) generally perform better, which is in line with previous findings in the literature (e.g., Judson and
Owen, 1999). Importantly, our conclusions regarding the performance of these methods remain unchanged.
12
As mentioned, our experiments explicitly allow for a correlation between the fixed effect,
ηi, and the explanatory variable, xit , i.e., E [xitηi] 6= 0.13 To model this type of endogeneity,
we generate ηi using ηi = µ (1− γ)σvσ−1zi zi, where zi = x¯i− x¯, with x¯i = T
−1∑
T
t=1 xit being the
within-group means, and x¯= (NT )−1∑Ni=1∑
T
t=1 xit being the overall mean.
14 Since the variance
of the fixed effect is σ2η = µ
2 (1− γ)2σ2v , the correlation between ηi and xit is Cov(ηi,xit) =
µ (1− γ)σvσ−1zi Cov(xit ,zi) where the analytic forms of σ
2
zi
and Cov(xit ,zi) are derived in our
internet appendix. In the special case where we assume away any correlation between ηi and





Following existing simulation studies (Kiviet, 1995; Judson and Owen, 1999; Bruno, 2005;
Everaert and Pozzi, 2007), we examine the effects of two key control parameters, namely the
loading factor, denoted µ , and the signal-to-noise ratio, denoted ϑ , on the finite-sample perfor-
mance of the estimators. First, the loading factor measures the impact of the fixed effect, ηi,





When the impact on yit of the fixed effect, (1− γ)
−1ση , and that of the error term, σ2ν , have
equal magnitudes, the loading factor is equal to unity, i.e., µ=1. However, when the impact of
the fixed effect is bigger than that of the disturbance, the loading factor increases, which could
lead to greater estimation bias. It is established that the loading factor significantly affects the
finite-sample performance of the estimators (e.g., Judson and Owen, 1999; Hayakawa, 2012).
The second key control parameter, the signal-to-noise ratio, measures the variance ratio of
the signal contained in yit−1 and xit (i.e., the explanatory power of these regressors), to the
noise, vit . The higher the signal-to-noise ratio, the more useful is the regressor in explaining
yit and the better will be the performance of the estimators (Judson and Owen, 1999; Bruno,
13Here we follow previous research and specify the fixed effect as a function of xit (e.g., Chamberlain, 1982).
14Using a minimum-variance benchmark, Baker and Ruback (1999) show via simulations that the harmonic
mean of a multiple (e.g., a financial performance ratio such as profitability) for an industry, or more generally, for
a group of firms is more appropriate than alternative estimators, including the arithmetic mean (i.e., the simple
mean used in our study). The latter estimator tends to put greater weights on firm-year observations with extreme
values. Empirically, however, this concern is often negated because multiples are usually winsorized in order to
reduce the potential effects of outliers.
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2005). Formally, we follow Kiviet (1995) and rewrite (4) as:




where yit is decomposed into the weighted sum of two stationary AR(2) processes, ϕit =
(γ +ρ)ϕi,t−1− γρϕi,t−2+ ξit and ψit = (γ +φ)ψi,t−1− γφψi,t−2+ εit , and the (long-run) un-
observed fixed effect ηi/(1− γ), which are mutually independent of one another. Defining the
latent variable, wit = βϕit+ψit = yit−ηi/(1− γ), we are able to derive the signal-to-noise ratio
as ϑ = σ2s /σ
2
v , where σ
2
s is the variance of the signal sit = wit − vit ; see our internet appendix
for detailed derivations and the exact form of σ2s .
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In order to mimic actual company data, we set the values of the two main control parameters
to µ = 3 and ϑ = 6, based on the empirical findings from the full- and sub-sample analyses of
Compustat company data for the period from 1967 to 2006. Specifically, they are equal to the
median values of the estimates from our rolling regressions of corporate leverage on a set of
explanatory variables estimated using the IV/GMM and bias-corrected estimators.16
In sum, we consider five simulation experiments. Experiment 1 is our benchmark case with
parameter values γ = 0.8, β = 0.2, ρ = 0.5, µ = 3, ϑ = 6, with E [xitηi] 6= 0, and φ = 0. Next,
we examine the impact of varying the loading factor, to µ = 6 or µ = 1, in Experiment 2, and
the impact of increasing the signal-to-noise ratio, to ϑ = 12, in Experiment 3. Experiment 4
investigates a setting similar to Experiment 1, but assumes no correlation between the regressor
and the fixed effect, i.e., E [xitηi] = 0. Finally, Experiment 5 assesses the impact of serial cor-
relation in the error term, vit , with φ =−0.3 or φ = 0.3.17 In all experiments, we set N = 400
and use 1,000 replications. We consider the case with T = 10 as this length approximates the
median and mean lengths of the (unbalanced) Compustat company data often used in empirical
15In our simulations, it is straightforward to control both parameters, ϑ and µ , i.e., we can control ϑ by adjusting
σ2ξ given σ
2
v , and µ by adjusting ση given σv in (7).
16Following Flannery and Rangan (2006) and subsequent capital structure studies (Byoun, 2008; Faulkender et
al., 2012), in those regressions we regress leverage on its lagged value and eight explanatory variables, namely
profitability, market-to-book, depreciation, firm size, tangibility, research and development and its dummy vari-
able, and the industry median of leverage. We consider 11 subsamples with the longest panel length of 30 years.
See Section 4 for details. Based on the rolling regressions for those subsamples, we find that µˆ varies between 2.5
and 3.7, while ϑˆ varies between 3.6 and 8.
17Recently, Davidson and Monticini (2014) have proposed a (robust) dependent wild bootstrap procedure in the
presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form. Given that exisiting studies have generally
ignored the issue of time-varying heterogeneity, it would be useful to investigate this issue in future research.
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corporate research and is in line with previous simulation studies (Judson and Owen, 1999).18
Finally, following Kiviet (1995), we generate the data carefully by deriving the initial condi-
tions for xi0 and yi0 to avoid any slow convergence problems and a waste of random numbers;
see our internet appendix for further details.19
3.2. Main simulation results
To evaluate the relative performance of each estimator, we use three conventional criteria,
namely the bias, the standard error (SE), and the RMSE of the estimates. We are interested
in the estimates of the autoregressive coefficient, γ , and the coefficient on the explanatory
variable, β . For the IV/GMM estimators, we also report the rejection frequencies of the AR(2)
and Sargan tests, enabling us to evaluate the validity of these estimators. We assess the accuracy
of the estimate of the long-run target financial policy, θˆxit , via the mean absolute error (MAE).
3.2.1. Experiment 1: Benchmark simulation
Table 1 reports the benchmark simulation results. First, with respect to γ, the POLS and FE
estimators are most biased (by 0.097 and -0.126, respectively). In economic terms, this finding
suggests that using POLS (FE) in research on target adjustment behavior potentially underesti-
mates (overestimates) the adjustment speed, δ , by 10% (13%). Thus, POLS and FE are clearly
not suitable for estimating the SOA in empirical corporate finance. Among the IV/GMM esti-
mators, AH-IV and FD-GMM are both downwardly biased, by -0.074 and -0.064 respectively,
while SYS-GMM is upwardly biased by 0.080; this bias is sizable, both statistically and eco-
nomically. The LD- and LDP-GMM estimators perform better, with a moderate amount of bias
(-0.021 and -0.016, respectively). However, the bias-corrected estimators, LSDVC, BC, and II,
are the most favorable methods for estimating γ , with negligible bias (-0.007, 0.009, and 0.009,
respectively). In terms of efficiency, most of the IV/GMM estimators (except for SYS-GMM)
18To examine the asymptotic performance of the estimators, we have also considered a longer time period,
T = 30, which approximates the longest Compustat panel length. Unreported results suggest that, as T increases,
estimation bias decreases and efficiency improves, consistent with theory.
19We perform our Monte Carlo simulations in Stata. For POLS and FE, we use the Stata procedures reg and
xtreg, respectively. In terms of the IV/GMM estimators, we use Roodman’s (2009b) Stata procedure xtabond2.
Following Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998), we include all lagged instruments in our
GMM regressions; however, see Roodman (2009a) and Wintoki et al. (2012) for an alternative approach using
fewer instruments. For the LD- and LDP-GMMmethods, we implement a Stata code based on Huang and Ritter’s
(2009) approach. Regarding the bias-corrected estimators, we use Bruno’s (2005) Stata procedure xtlsdvc for
LSDVC and our own Stata codes for BC and II. To implement the DPF estimation, we follow Elsas and Florysiak
(2014) and use xttobit. All our Stata codes are available upon request.
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have large SEs.20 In contrast, LSDVC, BC, and II are highly efficient and, moreover, have
the smallest RMSEs. Taking these findings together, LSDVC, BC, and II outperform the other
estimators in estimating γ and δ .
Second, in terms of β , most of the estimators, except for POLS and SYS-GMM, estimate
this coefficient reasonably well. They all have a fairly small amount of bias, and low SEs and
RMSEs. Third, turning to the estimates of the target financial variable, POLS, FE, and the
IV/GMM estimators (except for LD- and LDP-GMM) are highly inaccurate: their MAEs vary
between 0.91 and 3.72. In contrast, LSDVC, BC, and II are considerably more reliable, with
the smallest MAEs (0.16, 0.28, and 0.26, respectively).21 Next, regarding the diagnostic tests,
the Sargan test strongly rejects the null of valid instruments in the GMM estimations (except
for LDP-GMM). In particular, it is frequently rejected (38.5%) in the SYS-GMM regressions,
implying that, in practice, this method is likely to suffer from the problem of invalid instru-
ments.
In sum, our benchmark simulation shows that POLS and FE are severely biased and in-
efficient and, thus, are inappropriate for estimating dynamic panel data models in corporate
research. The IV/GMM estimators are highly unreliable while the bias-corrected estimators,
LSDVC, BC, and II, are the most appropriate methods. In what follows, we examine whether
the performance of the alternative estimators is robust to changes in the key control parameters.
We focus our discussion on the IV/GMM estimators and bias-corrected estimators.
3.2.2. Experiment 2: Changes in the relative magnitude of the fixed effect
In Table 2, we examine how varying the magnitude of the fixed effect relative to that of the
idiosyncratic error, measured by the loading factor µ , affects the performance of the estimators.
First, we find that the IV/GMM estimators are highly sensitive to changes in µ , which is in line
with the panel data literature (e.g., Kiviet, 1995; Judson and Owen, 1999) but is inconsistent
with FH’s remark that their simulation results are marginally affected by varying the loading
factor. Specifically, in Panel A, when we increase µ from 3 to 6, the performance of both
20FH use the RMSE to evaluate the performance of the estimators. However, using the RMSE as the sole
criterion is likely to favor SYS-GMM among the IV/GMM estimators. For example, we find that SYS-GMM has
a smaller RMSE than both AH-IV and FD-GMM, but is more biased than the latter two methods.
21Our results (untabulated) also show that LSDVC, BC, and II estimate the long-run coefficient with smallest
amount of bias.
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AH-IV and SYS-GMM, especially with respect to γ , deteriorates seriously: the amount of
bias they exhibit, their SEs, and their RMSEs all increase considerably. Although FD-, LD-,
and LD-GMM yield relatively precise estimates of γ and β , they still produce large SEs and
RMSEs, especially with respect to γ . These estimators (except for FD-GMM) also produce
their estimates of the target financial policy with rather large MAEs. In Panel B, we decrease
µ from 3 to 1, assuming that the effects of the fixed effect and the error on yit have equal
magnitudes. Here, as expected, the IV/GMM estimators show some improvements. However,
AH-IV, FD-, and SYS-GMM still estimate γ with a relatively large amount of bias (ranging
between -0.045 and 0.031), although they perform reasonably well with respect to β . These
methods seem to be outperformed by LD- and LDP-GMM, which estimate γ and β reasonably
well. Notice however that FD-, SYS-, and LD-GMM are still likely to suffer from the problem
of invalid instruments, as indicated by the high rejection frequencies of the Sargan test reported
in both panels.
Second, the three bias-corrected estimators are robust to the above changes in the relative
magnitude of the fixed effect. While BC and II are insensitive to the loading factor, LSDVC’s
performance changes little when µ = 6 (Panel A), and is only slightly affected when µ = 1
(Panel B). Moreover, all the three bias-corrected methods outperform the IV/GMM estimators
with respect to γ and β , whether µ = 6 or 1. Overall, these findings suggest that the bias-
corrected estimators remain the most favorable methods, regardless of the relative magnitude
of the fixed effect.
3.2.3. Experiment 3: Changes in the relative explanatory power of the regressor
In Table 3, we investigate the impact of varying the explanatory power of the regressor
relative to that of the error term, as measured by the signal-to-noise ratio, ϑ , on the properties
of the estimators. Specifically, we increase ϑ from 6 to 12 to consider a favorable setting
where the regressor, xit , has greater explanatory power than in the benchmark simulation. As
expected, for most of the estimators, performance with respect to γ and β generally improves.
However, although the IV/GMM estimators (except for AH-IV) estimate β more accurately
and efficiently, they still show substantial bias in relation to γ and fairly large MAEs with
respect to their target estimates. Further, as ϑ increases, the rejection frequencies of the Sargan
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test in the GMM regressions become remarkably high, especially for SYS-GMM, even though
its performance has generally improved. Overall, the most appropriate GMM estimators in
this setting are LD- and LDP-GMM, although these methods are still outperformed by the
bias-corrected methods, LSDVC, BC, and II. Compared to the benchmark experiment, the
estimation accuracy and efficiency of LSDVC and BC improve slightly with higher signal-to-
noise ratios. II shows the most remarkable improvement in its performance as it estimates both
γ and β with negligible bias, and very small SE, RMSE, and MAE. In short, LSDVC, BC, and
II are generally robust to changes in the relative explanatory power of the explanatory variable.
3.2.4. Experiment 4: No correlation between the regressor and the fixed effect
Our experiments have so far explicitly controlled for correlation between the explanatory
variable and the unobserved fixed effect.22 In Table 4, we investigate a restrictive setting where
xit is independent of the fixed effect, E [xitηi] = 0. We first find that the IV/GMM estimators
improve markedly, producing more accurate and efficient estimates of γ and β . The AH-IV,
SYS-, and LDP-GMM estimators perform very well, with SYS-GMM emerging as the most
appropriate method. The latter estimator estimates both γ and β with negligible bias, and very
small SEs and RMSEs. It also produces an estimate of the target financial policy with a small
MAE. The finding that SYS-GMM is the most favorable method under this setting is consistent
with FH’s main simulation results.
Regarding the bias-corrected estimators, we find that the properties of BC and II stay almost
the same as in the benchmark simulation. Importantly, these two methods still perform very
well with respect to γ and β , and are comparable to SYS-GMM, the most favorable method
in the present experiment. However, the performance of LSDVC with respect to γ deteriorates
slightly, although LSDVC and II exhibit the smallest MAE.
22In further analysis (unreported), we also consider the case with two-way endogeneity, due to the correlation
of the explanatory variable, xit , with both the fixed effect, ηi, and the idiosyncratic error term, vit . This scenario,
in theory, favors the GMM estimators, which can alleviate the second source of endogeneity via the use of lagged
instruments. However, we find that the GMM estimators do not perform well, despite their advanced treatment of
the endogeneity due to E [xitvit ] 6= 0. The bias-corrected estimators, especially LSDVC, remain generally robust,
although their performance deteriorates compared with the benchmark experiment. For empirical applications, we
thus recommend using the lagged values of the explanatory variables (xi,t−1) to avoid this endogeneity problem.
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3.2.5. Experiment 5: Residual serial correlation
In Table 5, we consider the impact of residual serial correlation on the performance of the
estimators. We set the AR(1) coefficient in (6) to be φ = 0.3 (i.e., positive autocorrelation)
or φ = −0.3 (i.e., negative autocorrelation).23 As expected, the performance of the IV/GMM
estimators deteriorates considerably when their critical assumption of no serial correlation is
violated. These methods now estimate γ with a very large amount of bias, varying between
0.068 and 0.551 (0.062 and -0.582) in the presence of positive (negative) serial correlation.
The IV/GMM estimators, especially AH-IV and FD-GMM, also tend to become much less
efficient, as they produce relatively large SEs and RMSEs. Further, their target estimates con-
tain substantial estimation errors (MAEs). As expected, the rejection frequencies of the AR(2)
and of the Sargan tests reach almost 100% in the IV/GMM regressions, confirming that these
methods are invalid in the presence of residual serial correlation. Note, however, that most of
the IV/GMM estimators (except for AH-IV and FD-GMM) still estimate β reasonably well,
although this coefficient is estimated more accurately by the FE estimator.
Turning to the bias-corrected estimators, BC’s performance when φ =−0.3 is, surprisingly,
marginally better than in the benchmark case. This method becomes slightly worse when φ =
0.3 but still outperforms the remaining methods: its bias in relation to γ is slightly on the high
side (0.035) but still acceptable. However, as expected, LSDVC deteriorates in the presence of
autocorrelation, a violation of the assumption underlying this estimator. Its bias regarding γ is
non-negligible (0.070 and -0.068), while its MAE with respect to the target estimate is rather
large, especially when φ = 0.3. The performance of II is heavily influenced by autocorrelation
simply because the simulated sample paths in the II procedure do not reflect this feature of the
DGP. Notably, this method now estimates γ with a large amount of bias (0.099 and -0.062) and
produces a highly inflated MAE (2.93), especially when φ = 0.3.
In sum, our results show that among the bias-corrected estimators, BC is the only method
robust to the presence of residual serial correlation. On the other hand, the IV/GMM estimators
become less reliable for dynamic panel data models with autocorrelation.24
23These values are chosen according to our subsample analysis, which is discussed in Section 4; they are
significantly higher than the trivial AR(2) coefficients of 0.1 and 0.05 considered by FH.
24A solution to residual serial correlation involves extending the ARDL(1,0) model (2) to an ARDL(2,1) model.
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3.3. Further extensions: Fractional dependent variables
In empirical corporate research, the financial policy variable of interest (e.g., leverage) can
be a ratio bounded by 0 and 1. Loudermilk (2007) argues that the fractional property of the
dependent variable may lead to estimation bias in dynamic panels. The author develops an
augmented Tobit estimator, in which the latent dependent variable can take values outside the
unit interval but is doubly censored at the corner outcomes of 0 and 1. Moreover, based on
Wooldridge (2005), Loudermilk (2007) models the distribution of the unobserved fixed effects,
ηi, conditional on the initial value, yi1, and the exogenous explanatory variable, x¯i. This esti-
mation is effectively a combination of the Tobit estimation and the correlated random-effects
(maximum likelihood) estimation (hereafter CRE), with two additional regressors, yi1 and x¯i.
Elsas and Florysiak (2014, hereafter EF) further extend Loudermilk’s (2007) method to the
case of unbalanced panels and name this estimator DPF.
We now compare the performance of the IV/GMM and bias-corrected estimators with that
of the DPF estimator in an additional Monte Carlo simulation where the dependent variable is
generated as a ratio bounded by 0 and 1. We design our simulation as follows. First, based
on EF’s simulation, we account for the fractional nature of the dependent variable, yit , by
generating a latent variable, y#it :
y#it = γyi,t−1+βxit +ηi+ vit , i= 1, . . . ,N; t = 2, . . . ,T, (9)
ηi = α0+α1yi1+α2x¯i+αi, (10)
y#i1 = βxi1+α0+α2x¯i+αi+ vi1, (11)
where xit ∼U (xL,xU), x¯i = T−1∑
T








, and αi, xit , and vit are
independently generated. We then doubly censor y#it at the corner outcomes, 0 and 1, to obtain
yit . That is, we set yit = 0 if y#it ≤ 0, yit = y
#
it if 0 < y
#
it < 1, and yit = 1 if y
#
it ≥ 1. Following
Loudermilk (2007) and EF, we also include within the fixed effect, ηi, two additional terms,
yi1 and x¯i. In this DGP, we set (N,T ) = (400,10), γ = 0.8, and β = 0.2, as in the main
simulation studies in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Next, we select the parameter values as follows:
Our analysis (unreported) shows that BC is also appropriate for the ARDL(2,1) model.
20
xL =−0.5, xU = 1, α0 = 0, α1 = 0.1, α2 =−0.25, σv = 0.05, and σα = (0.05,0.10). We vary
σα in order to investigate how changing the magnitude of the fixed effect relative to that of
the idiosyncratic error affects the performance of the estimators. By varying σα , we can also
control for the percentage of firm-year observations that lie outside the unit interval and are
hence to be doubly censored. We find that the percentage censored is 9% when σα = 0.05, and
21% when σα = 0.10.
The DGP in (9) assumes a dynamic structure whereby the (true, but unobserved) dependent
variable, y#it , depends recursively on the past realizations of yi,t−1, rather than those of y
#
i,t−1.
However, this process has two potential shortcomings. First, it may not be consistent with the
dynamics of the financial policy variable. Consider an example where the fractional dependent
variable is leverage. In this case, the latent dependent variable, y#it , is often interpreted as the
firm’s target leverage ratio or debt capacity, which can take values outside the unit interval (see
EF). However, to the extent that y#it proxies for target leverage, it should depend on its past
realizations, as modeled by the partial adjustment framework (2). Second, by assuming that
y#it depends on yit−1, not y
#
i,t−1, this DGP favors the Tobit method and guarantees that DPF, an
augmented Tobit estimator, will perform well. To address these two potential limitations of
the DGP in (9), we consider an alternative DGP whereby the latent dependent variable, y#it , is
generated by the following partial adjustment model (see also Hu, 2002):
y#it = γy
#
i,t−1+βxit +ηi+ vit , i= 1, . . . ,N; t = 2, . . . ,T. (12)
The difference between (9) and (12) is that the latter includes y#i,t−1 rather than yi,t−1 in the














In Table 6, we report the simulation results for the two DGPs, (9) in Panels A and B, and
(12) in Panels C and D. First, we find from Panel A that DPF estimates both γ and β highly
accurately and efficiently, with the least amount of bias and the smallest SEs.25 Nevertheless,
several other estimators also perform reasonably well. AH-IV and LD-GMM produce their
25We provide more comprehensive simulation results than EF, who only consider the relative performance of
POLS, FE, SYS-GMM, LD-GMM, LSDVC, and DPF, and report the simulation results for γ (see their Table 2).
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estimates of γ and, to a lesser extent, β with negligible bias, while FD-GMM, LSDVC, BC,
and II yield a small to moderate amount of bias, and moderate SEs and RMSEs. However,
in Panel B, when we increase the percentage of censoring, the results become more favorable
toward DPF. This estimator now outperforms most of the other methods, except for LD-GMM,
which still estimates γ reasonably well.
Next, the results for the second DGP, (12), reported in Panel C, show that DPF is no longer
the most favorable method for estimating γ and β . It estimates γ with non-negligible bias,
in fact even more than that produced by AH-IV, LDP-GMM, and LSDVC. Moving to Panel
D, as expected, most of the estimators exhibit deteriorating performance as the percentage of
censoring increases (33% compared to 15% in Panel C). Surprisingly, although DPF performs
well in this setting, it does not dominate the other estimators. It estimates γ less accurately and
efficiently than LD-GMM and BC. However, DPF still produces the most accurate estimate
of β and the target long-run relationship with the smallest MAE. Our results are inconsistent
with EF’s finding that DPF outperforms the other estimators in a simulation based on a similar
censoring scheme (in which the authors first generate the complete set of panel data before
introducing censoring; see their footnote 19). Our simulations show that DPF is sensitive to the
DGP used and that it does not always dominate the other estimators.
In sum, we find that DPF is the most robust estimator in the presence of severe censoring
at the corner outcomes and a relatively high magnitude of the fixed effect.26 However, if cen-
soring is not a serious issue and the relative magnitude of the fixed effect is moderate, the other
estimators, such as LD-GMM, LDP-GMM, LSDVC and, in some cases, BC, can also produce
fairly accurate results, with respect to both γ and β . In capital structure research, for example,
recent studies show that about 9% of firms have zero leverage (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013).27
With this mild level of censoring, our simulations suggest that the average effects for fractional
dependent variables in linear models can still be estimated with a small amount of bias; see
also Papke and Wooldridge (2008).
26The strong and robust performance of DPF is not simply due to its unique double-censoring mechanism, but
is also due to the inclusion of the additional regressors, yi1 and x¯i, which provide a near-perfect solution to the
unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity (Chamberlain, 1984; Wooldridge, 2005, 2010).
27In our sample covering the period between 1967 and 2006, we find that 9,387 out of a total of 103,556
firm-year observations (also about 9%) have zero leverage, while no observations have leverage above 1.
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4. Empirical applications
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the estimators in an empirical application
in corporate finance. We examine one of the most interesting, yet contentious, questions in
empirical capital structure research, i.e., how quickly firms adjust toward their target leverage
ratios. To this end, we estimate the following dynamic model:
yit = γyi,t−1+β
′
xi,t−1+ηi+ τt + vit , (13)
which is similar to the baseline dynamic specification (2). The model further includes year
dummies, τt , except in the LD-GMM (cross-sectional) regression, and the LDP-GMM and LS-
DVC regressions, which do not allow for time effects.28 We measure the dependent variable,
yit , by book leverage.29 In terms of the explanatory variables, we follow Flannery and Ran-
gan (2006) and include the first lagged values of profitability (EBIT), market-to-book (MB),
depreciation (DEP), firm size (TA), tangibility (FA), research and development (RD) and its
dummy variable (RDD), and the industry median of leverage (IND). The use of lagged val-
ues addresses a potential endogeneity problem in which the contemporaneous values of the
explanatory variables may be correlated with the idiosyncratic error term, i.e., E [xitvit ] 6= 0.
We collect annual accounting data for US firms from the Compustat database, for the period
1967–2006. Our sample of panel data is unbalanced with the mean and median lengths of 15
and 14 years, respectively. Following standard practice, we exclude financial firms (SIC codes
6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC codes 4900-4999). We winsorize all independent variables
at the 1st and 99th percentiles as in previous studies (e.g., Flannery and Rangan, 2006). Table
7 provides variable definitions and summary statistics. To preserve space, we will not discuss
these statistics here because they are generally consistent with those reported in earlier studies
on capital structure (e.g., Flannery and Rangan, 2006).
28To sidestep the issue with year dummies, in a robustness check, we demean the variables and then apply the
LDP-GMM and LSDVC estimators. The results (untabulated) are qualitatively similar.
29Several studies use book leverage as the main measure of leverage (Fama and French, 2002; Chang and
Dasgupta, 2009). We also consider market leverage and obtain qualitatively similar results for the SOA.
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4.1. Speed of Adjustment
Table 8 reports the regression results for the dynamic partial adjustment model of leverage
(13). First, the results clearly show that the SOA varies considerably, depending on the estima-
tion method employed. The POLS and FE estimates are 15% and 40%, respectively, consistent
with previous evidence in the literature (e.g., Lemmon et al., 2008). There is a large difference
between these estimates because POLS has downward bias, while FE has upward bias, which
is in line with our simulation results. Turning to the IV/GMM methods, the LDP-GMM esti-
mate of the SOA is 7%, which seems inappropriate because it does not fall into the range of the
POLS and FE estimates (15%–40%).30 The LDP-GMM estimate is sensitive to the choice of
the long-difference parameter, k: when k= 8, the SOA is estimated at 15.5%. The estimates of
the SOA obtained using AH-IV, FD-, SYS-, and LD-GMM vary between 15% and 18%, close
to the (biased) POLS estimate. On closer inspection of the Sargan and AR(2) test results, these
estimates are unreliable because their fundamental assumptions of valid instruments and no
autocorrelation are violated in most cases. Specifically, there is evidence of negative autocorre-
lation in the AH-IV and FD-GMM regressions, which, as shown in our simulation experiments,
has a serious effect on the performance of these estimators. In short, the IV/GMM estimators
seem to produce unreliable estimates of the SOA in capital structure research.
The bias-corrected estimators, LSDVC and BC, obtain very similar adjustment speeds, of
26% and 28%, respectively. II produces a slightly lower estimate of 24%. DPF, the only
estimator that explicitly accounts for the fractional nature of leverage, yields an estimate of
27%. Our earlier simulation results suggest that, among the methods reviewed in this paper,
LSDVC, BC, and II are the most appropriate estimators in our overall simulation experiments,
while DPF is the most robust method in the special case with a fractional dependent variable.
However, if the percentage of censoring is small, as is indeed the case in this application (see
footnote 27 above), the performance of LSDVC, BC, and II is also acceptable.31 Our empirical
30We follow a general consensus in the literature (e.g., Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Huang and Ritter, 2009) and
conjecture that an unbiased estimate should lie between the POLS and FE estimates, which are biased downwardly
and upwardly, respectively. Note, however, that Zhou et al. (2014) argue that such conjecture may no longer hold
under certain conditions involving model misspecifications in which the direction of the POLS bias becomes
ambiguous, although the FE estimate continues to provide an upper bound on the SOA.
31EF further contend that DPF can distinguish mechanical mean reversion (hereafter MMR) from real target
leverage adjustment; see Chang and Dasgupta (2009) for a discussion of MMR. They argue that when the data
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results are thus in line with these simulation findings because all three methods yield similar
estimates of the SOA.
Given that the SOAs estimated by LSDVC, BC, II, and DPF vary in a tight range between
24% and 28%, we conjecture that these estimates are closest to the true SOA for our Compustat
sample. An adjustment speed in the range of 24%-28% implies half-lives of approximately 2.2
years, which, compared to the 14-year median life of firms in our sample, provides evidence
of moderate adjustment.32 In other words, firms seem to adjust toward their target leverage
ratios at moderate rates. Overall, our analysis demonstrates the importance of using appropriate
methods in empirical capital structure research. For example, the POLS, AH-IV, LD-, and FD-
GMM estimates of 15% (with half-lives of 4.3 years) would indicate sluggish adjustment, while
the FD estimate of 40% (with a half-life of 1.36 years) would suggest very rapid adjustment.
Researchers using these unreliable results would run the risk of reaching incorrect conclusions
about target adjustment behavior.
4.2. Coefficients on the explanatory variables
We next study whether the alternative estimators can reasonably estimate the coefficients
on the determinants of leverage. We examine whether the signs of the coefficients are consis-
tent with the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence in the literature. As suggested by
Frank and Goyal (2009), we focus on the five most important determinants of leverage, namely
profitability (EBIT), the market-to-book ratio (MB), firm size (TA), tangibility (FA), and the
industry median of leverage (IND). Following previous capital structure research (Titman and
Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Byoun, 2008; Lemmon
et al., 2008), we expect leverage to be inversely related to profitability and the market-to-book
ratio, but positively associated with firm size, tangibility, and the industry median of leverage;
see also Parsons and Titman (2009) for a review. Specifically, profitable firms are likely to
have low leverage, as predicted by the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers,
are simulated under random financing such that there is no target adjustment behavior, the SOA estimated by DPF
is equal to zero, while those estimated by the other methods are positive. In our internet appendix, we conduct
another simulation study on leverage processes generated under random financing. However, we do not find that
DPF outperforms the other estimators.
32The “half life” represents the number of years it takes a company to move halfway toward its target leverage
after a leverage shock. Formally, it is calculated as ln0.5/ ln(1−δ ).
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1984) and by dynamic trade-off models (e.g., Leary and Roberts, 2005; Strebulaev, 2007).33
Within a broad trade-off framework, agency theories predict a negative relation between the
market-to-book ratio and leverage because high- (low-) growth firms use less (more) leverage
to mitigate under- (over-) investment incentives (Myers, 1977; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Firm size and leverage are positively related because large firms have low bankruptcy, agency,
and transaction costs, hence strong incentives to utilize debt. Tangibility has a positive impact
on leverage because tangible assets can be used as collateral to mitigate the asset substitution
problem, thus reducing the agency costs of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The industry
median of leverage is often used as the benchmark leverage ratio, or as a control for common,
but otherwise omitted, factors affecting all firms within the industry (Hovakimian et al., 2001);
this variable is expected to have a positive impact on leverage (Flannery and Rangan, 2006).
The results in Table 8 show that the coefficients on the main explanatory variables are not
well estimated by the IV/GMM methods. In the AH-IV and FD-GMM regressions, EBIT is
significantly positive and MB is insignificant at the 5% level, while TA, FA, and IND are all
significantly negative. None of these results are consistent with either the theoretical predic-
tions or the existing evidence in the literature. In the SYS-GMM regression, although FA is
significantly positive, EBIT is significant with an unexpected sign, while MB and TA are both
insignificant. In the LD-GMMmodel, EBIT is significantly negative, as expected, but MB, TA,
FA, and IND are all insignificant. Finally, in the LDP-GMM regression, MB is insignificant,
while EBIT, FA, and IND are all significant with the unexpected signs. In sum, our analysis
suggests that studies using the IV/GMM methods may obtain unreasonable estimates of target
leverage and, consequently, support target adjustment behavior when there is no meaningful
target estimate.
The coefficient estimates obtained using LSDVC, BC, II, and DPF are in line with expec-
tations. Specifically, the two variables EBIT and MB are always significantly negative, while
TA, FA, and IND are significantly positive. The magnitudes of these coefficients are also com-
parable across the three models. Overall, LSDVC, BC, II, and DPF provide the most plausible
33The static trade-off framework suggests that profitable firms should lever up in order to take advantage of the
debt tax shield. However, most cross-sectional empirical evidence documents a negative effect of profitability on
leverage. See Xu (2012) for an exception.
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results in terms of the statistical significance and signs of the coefficients on the main explana-
tory variables. The results obtained with these methods suggest that firms adjust with moderate
speeds toward well-defined target leverage ratios.
4.3. Additional tests
As a first robustness check, we conduct a subsample analysis to evaluate the performance of
each estimator in a time-varying context. We examine the results obtained from 11 rolling lever-
age regressions, each for a 30-year (unbalanced) subsample, with the first subsample covering
the period 1967–1996, and the last one covering the period 1977–2006.34 Our (untabulated)
results show that the IV/GMM methods are not only inappropriate for the whole sample, but
are also unreliable for the time-varying subsamples. Their estimates of the SOA of leverage
continue to be biased, while their estimates of the other coefficients often have the wrong sign
and exhibit a large amount of variation. Meanwhile, LSDVC, BC, II, and DPF are again the
most robust estimators as they produce reasonable estimates of all the coefficients that are in
line with our prior expectations.
Since leverage is fractional, our findings may not be relevant to other areas in corporate
research where the dependent variable is not a ratio bounded by the unit interval. To address
this concern, we also conduct a second empirical study on dynamic cash holdings. Following
Foley et al. (2007) and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009, hereafter BKS), we measure cash hold-
ings as the natural logarithm of the cash-to-net-assets ratio. We follow BKS and include as
the explanatory variables industry cash flow volatility (IND_CFASD), market-to-book (MB),
firm size (TA), cash flow (CFA), net working capital (NWC), capital expenditure (CAPEX),
R&D expenditure (RDS), book leverage (BDR), acquisition expenditure (MA), and the divi-
dend payout dummy (DIV). Our analysis, reported in Table 9, shows that LSDVC, BC, II, yield
reasonable, similar estimates of the SOA of cash, at 48-49%, which are close to the midpoint
between the POLS and FE estimates.35 The adjustment speeds obtained using AH-IV (54%),
FD-GMM (53%), and SYS-GMM (52%) are relatively closer to the biased FE estimate (63%).
34The mean and median lengths of these (unbalanced) panels are 8 and 6 years, respectively.
35An estimate of this size indicates a half-life of 1.1 years, suggesting that firms adjust quite rapidly toward
their optimal cash holdings. While this SOA is much greater than those typically estimated in capital structure
research, it is in line with recent evidence on dynamic cash adjustment (e.g., Dittmar and Duchin, 2011).
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The bias in the IV/GMM results may be due to the presence of invalid instruments and (pos-
itive) residual serial correlation, as indicated by the strong rejection of the Sargan and AR(2)
tests in most of these regressions. Finally, using the bias-corrected estimators, LSDVC, BC,
and II, we also obtain estimates of coefficients on the explanatory variables that are generally
in line with theoretical expectations.
5. Conclusions
Many studies in empirical corporate finance have employed dynamic panel data models to
examine the dynamic behavior of corporate financial policy variables. However, a major dif-
ficulty in using these models is determining how to obtain consistent and efficient estimates,
especially in short panels of company data, in the likely presence of (1) unobserved hetero-
geneity and endogeneity, (2) residual serial correlation, or (3) fractional dependent variables.
Which estimators should researchers use in these contexts?
To address this important research question, we investigate two classes of advanced econo-
metric techniques for dynamic panel data models, including (1) the instrumental variable ap-
proach, the first-difference, system, and long-difference GMM, and (2) the bias-corrected esti-
mators, based on an analytical approach, an iterative bootstrap procedure, or a simulation-based
indirect inference technique. Further, we consider an augmented Tobit estimator that accounts
for the fractional nature of the dependent variable. We conduct Monte Carlo simulation experi-
ments and present empirical applications, to capital structure and cash holdings, to examine the
relative performance of the estimators.
Overall, we find that the bias-corrected estimators, LSDVC, BC, and II, are generally most
appropriate and robust for estimating dynamic panel data models in empirical corporate re-
search. These methods can estimate the autoregressive coefficient and the coefficients on the
explanatory variables with the most accuracy and efficiency. In our simulations, they are also
robust to changes in the key control parameters, including the relative magnitude of the fixed
effects and the relative explanatory power of the regressors. Of these three methods, BC per-
forms relatively well even in regressions with autocorrelation, and in models with higher lag
orders, such as the ARDL(2,1) model; it is also computationally less demanding than both LS-
DVC and II. In the specific case where the dependent variable is a ratio, and censored at 0 and
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1, LSDVC, BC, and II may still provide reasonable estimates with a moderate amount of bias,
although at a high level of censoring researchers should consider using DPF. In our applications
using capital structure and cash holdings, we find that LSDVC, BC, and II produce empirically
the most plausible estimates of the speeds of dynamic leverage and cash adjustments, and rea-
sonable estimates of the coefficients on the explanatory variables, which are consistent with
prior theoretical predictions.
However, the IV/GMM estimators generally perform poorly in our simulation and empiri-
cal studies. Their estimates of the autoregressive coefficient tend to be biased and unreliable.
Moreover, these methods are sensitive to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and, in par-
ticular, serially correlated errors. We identify a few conditions (e.g., optimal instruments and
no autocorrelation) under which these methods can be useful, although in our empirical appli-
cations these conditions prove to be restrictive and unrealistic. Consequently, the regression
results obtained using these methods are unreliable.
In sum, our study suggests that the IV/GMM estimators should be used with extreme care,
and that future empirical research in corporate finance should consider employing the highly
robust bias-corrected estimators, especially BC. We also find that while II is a useful general
and versatile approach to bias correction, it is computationally challenging, especially in the
multidimensional case where further research on the iterative algorithm for II is warranted.
We conclude with some limitations and avenues for future research. First, while our sim-
ulations have systematically examined the most important issues in the estimation of dynamic
panel data models, we cannot account for all of the specific settings and minor issues encoun-
tered in the vast empirical research literature. Further, while our simulation results should
generalize to many areas of corporate finance, our empirical applications are restricted to two
topics, namely capital structure and cash holdings. Hence, it would be useful for future research
to verify our simulation and empirical findings in other areas of corporate finance. Second, our
study does not account for a possibility that the (individual) firm fixed effects are time-varying
or, more generally, that the error components are cross-sectionally correlated. Recent research
shows that existing estimation procedures are significantly affected by cross-sectional depen-
dence (e.g., Pesaran, 2006; Ahn et al., 2007; Bai, 2009). Thus, it would be important for future
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studies to examine the properties of alternative methods for estimating dynamic panel data
models with cross-sectionally correlated errors. Third, in empirical research, firms with differ-
ent characteristics may have different response coefficients and adjust towards their long-term
optimal financial policies at different rates (e.g., Byoun, 2008; Dang et al., 2012; Faulkender
et al., 2012). Hence, it would be more realistic to allow for heterogeneous slope parameters
(e.g., Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Pesaran et al., 1999). Finally, while our study adopts a “horse-
race” approach to compare the properties of alternative estimators, it would be useful for future
studies to evaluate the performance of a pooled estimation approach that combines different
(bias-corrected) estimators, as proposed by Zhou et al. (2014).
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Table 1. Performance of alternative estimators: Benchmark simulation experiment
Estimators POLS FE AH-IV FD-GMM SYS-GMM LD-GMM LDP-GMM LSDVC BC II
Bias (γ) 0.097 -0.126 -0.074 -0.064 0.080 -0.021 -0.016 -0.007 0.009 0.009
SE (γ) 0.004 0.011 0.097 0.065 0.010 0.044 0.026 0.011 0.016 0.013
RMSE (γ) 0.097 0.127 0.122 0.091 0.080 0.049 0.031 0.013 0.019 0.016
Bias (β ) 0.022 0.001 -0.006 -0.006 0.015 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003
SE (β ) 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
RMSE (β ) 0.023 0.005 0.011 0.010 0.016 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
AR(2) 3.8% 4.3% 4.4%
Sargan 10.4% 38.5% 12.1% 5.8%
MAE 3.72 1.24 1.92 0.91 2.57 0.60 0.33 0.16 0.28 0.26
Notes: POLS and FE refer to the pooled OLS and fixed-effects methods. AH-IV is the instrumental variable estimator. FD- and SYS-GMM are
the first-difference and system GMM estimators. LD- and LDP-GMM are long-difference estimators; the former uses the longest differencing
parameter, while the latter sets the differencing parameter at 4. LSDVC, BC, and II are three bias-corrected (fixed-effects) estimators, based on an
analytical approach, an iterative bootstrap, and a simulation-based procedure using MLE as the baseline estimator, respectively. See our Internet
Appendix for detailed estimation algorithms for BC and II. The DGP is given by (4)-(6) with the following simulation parameters: γ = 0.8, β = 0.2,
ρ = 0.5, ϑ = 6, µ = 3, E [xitηi] 6= 0, φ = 0, and T = 10. The performance of each estimator is evaluated by bias (Bias), standard error (SE), and
root mean square error (RMSE). AR(2) denotes the rejection frequencies of the AR(2) test, a test for the null of no residual serial correlation
for AH-IV, FD-, and SYS-GMM. Sargan denotes the rejection frequencies of the Sargan test, a test for the joint null of validity of the moment
conditions (over-identifying restrictions), for FD-, SYS-, LD-, and LDP-GMM. Both tests are evaluated at the 5% significance level. MAE is the
mean absolute error, which measures the accuracy of the estimate of the (long-run) target financial policy.
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Table 2. The impact of changes in the magnitude of the fixed effect
Estimators POLS FE AH-IV FD-GMM SYS-GMM LD-GMM LDP-GMM LSDVC BC II
Panel A: High loading factor (µ = 6)
Bias (γ) 0.141 -0.126 -0.503 -0.025 0.115 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.009 0.009
SE (γ) 0.002 0.011 10.482 0.071 0.008 0.098 0.089 0.011 0.016 0.013
RMSE (γ) 0.141 0.127 10.494 0.075 0.115 0.098 0.089 0.011 0.019 0.016
Bias (β ) 0.020 0.001 -0.041 -0.003 0.022 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.003
SE (β ) 0.005 0.005 0.890 0.008 0.007 0.019 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
RMSE (β ) 0.020 0.005 0.891 0.009 0.023 0.019 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005
AR(2) 3.5% 4.6% 4.4%
Sargan 9.8% 45.3% 17.0% 11.2%
MAE 8.79 1.24 4.40 0.98 5.23 2.26 1.88 0.17 0.28 0.26
Panel B: Low loading factor (µ = 1)
Bias (γ) 0.033 -0.126 -0.040 -0.045 0.031 -0.028 -0.020 -0.016 0.009 0.009
SE (γ) 0.006 0.011 0.047 0.032 0.013 0.040 0.021 0.012 0.016 0.013
RMSE (γ) 0.033 0.127 0.062 0.055 0.034 0.049 0.029 0.020 0.019 0.016
Bias (β ) 0.015 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003
SE (β ) 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
RMSE (β ) 0.016 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
AR(2) 4.0% 4.2% 4.0%
Sargan 9.7% 27.9% 12.2% 4.8%
MAE 0.93 1.24 0.70 0.63 0.74 0.94 0.34 0.24 0.28 0.26
Notes: The DGP is given by (4)-(6) with the following simulation parameters: γ = 0.8, β = 0.2, ρ = 0.5, ϑ = 6, E [xitηi] 6= 0, φ = 0, and T = 10.
The loading factor, µ , is set at µ = 6, and then µ = 1. See notes to Table 1 for abbreviations.
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Table 3. The impact of changes in the explanatory power of the regressor
Estimators POLS FE AH-IV FD-GMM SYS-GMM LD-GMM LDP-GMM LSDVC BC II
Bias (γ) 0.077 -0.081 -0.095 -0.063 0.074 -0.037 -0.022 -0.008 -0.005 0.000
SE (γ) 0.003 0.009 0.066 0.045 0.008 0.022 0.014 0.009 0.010 0.010
RMSE (γ) 0.077 0.081 0.116 0.077 0.075 0.043 0.026 0.011 0.011 0.010
Bias (β ) 0.016 0.000 -0.008 -0.006 0.009 0.003 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001
SE (β ) 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
RMSE (β ) 0.017 0.003 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
AR(2) 5.9% 6.2% 5.5%
Sargan 16.1% 72% 24% 13.8%
MAE 3.77 1.43 1.75 1.27 3.33 0.72 0.50 0.21 0.23 0.21
Notes: The DGP is given by (4)-(6) with the following simulation parameters: γ = 0.8, β = 0.2, ρ = 0.5, µ = 3, E [xitηi] 6= 0, φ = 0, and T = 10.
The signal-to-noise ratio, ϑ , is set at ϑ = 12. See notes to Table 1 for abbreviations.
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Table 4. The impact of no correlation between the regressor and the fixed effect
Estimators POLS FE AH-IV FD-GMM SYS-GMM LD-GMM LDP-GMM LSDVC BC II
Bias (γ) 0.113 -0.126 -0.026 -0.033 0.000 -0.040 -0.022 -0.017 0.009 0.010
SE (γ) 0.005 0.012 0.045 0.032 0.021 0.033 0.022 0.012 0.016 0.013
RMSE (γ) 0.113 0.126 0.052 0.046 0.021 0.052 0.031 0.021 0.019 0.016
Bias (β ) -0.021 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
SE (β ) 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.013 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
RMSE (β ) 0.021 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
AR(2) 5.4% 5.6% 5.3%
Sargan 6.5% 9% 9.1% 6%
MAE 3.44 1.23 0.61 0.53 0.27 0.53 0.36 0.26 0.28 0.26
Notes: The DGP is given by (4)-(6), with the following simulation parameters: γ = 0.8, β = 0.2, ρ = 0.5, µ = 3, ϑ = 6, φ = 0, and T = 10.
Contrary to the benchmark simulation, it is assumed that there is no correlation between the fixed effect and the regressor, i.e., E [xitηi] = 0. See
notes to Table 1 for abbreviations.
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Table 5. Performance of alternative estimators in the presence of residual serial correlation
Estimators POLS FE AH-IV FD-GMM SYS-GMM LD-GMM LDP-GMM LSDVC BC II
Panel A: Positive Residual Serial Correlation (φ = 0.3)
Bias (γ) 0.115 -0.060 0.551 -0.099 0.127 0.068 0.075 0.070 0.035 0.099
SE (γ) 0.004 0.011 0.177 0.081 0.010 0.054 0.026 0.012 0.023 0.012
RMSE (γ) 0.115 0.061 0.579 0.127 0.127 0.087 0.080 0.071 0.042 0.099
Bias (β ) 0.018 0.000 0.045 0.002 0.014 -0.011 -0.002 0.004 0.000 0.009
SE (β ) 0.006 0.006 0.015 0.011 0.007 0.017 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006
RMSE (β ) 0.019 0.006 0.047 0.011 0.016 0.020 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.011
AR(2) 95.8% 99.4% 99.4%
Sargan 100% 100% 99% 100%
MAE 4.22 0.62 5.57 0.84 5.35 2.66 2.27 1.56 0.65 2.93
Panel B: Negative Residual Serial Correlation (φ =−0.3)
Bias (γ) 0.087 -0.184 -0.582 -0.474 0.062 -0.096 -0.128 -0.068 0.004 -0.062
SE (γ) 0.003 0.012 0.117 0.164 0.013 0.031 0.017 0.012 0.013 0.013
RMSE (γ) 0.087 0.184 0.593 0.501 0.063 0.101 0.129 0.069 0.014 0.063
Bias (β ) 0.025 0.001 -0.047 -0.046 0.004 0.011 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.000
SE (β ) 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.013 0.006 0.013 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004
RMSE (β ) 0.025 0.004 0.048 0.048 0.007 0.017 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004
AR(2) 92.5% 94.9% 100%
Sargan 100% 100% 98% 100%
MAE 3.39 1.63 2.75 2.59 1.66 0.98 1.31 0.84 0.20 0.80
Notes: The DGP is given by (4)-(6) with the following simulation parameters: γ = 0.8, β = 0.2, ρ = 0.5, µ = 3, ϑ = 6, E [xitηi] 6= 0, and T = 10.
Two cases are considered: positive (φ = 0.3) and negative (φ =−0.3) residual serial correlation. See notes to Table 1 for abbreviations.
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Table 6. The impact of fractional dependent variables
Estimators POLS FE AH-IV FD-GMM SYS-GMM LD-GMM LDP-GMM LSDVC BC DPF II
Panel A: Scheme 1 with σα = 0.05 (censoring percentage of 9%)
Bias (γ) 0.099 -0.116 0.001 -0.024 0.062 0.007 -0.020 -0.021 0.039 0.003 0.046
SE (γ) 0.008 0.010 0.080 0.023 0.010 0.009 0.022 0.019 0.030 0.012 0.012
RMSE (γ) 0.099 0.116 0.080 0.033 0.063 0.012 0.029 0.028 0.049 0.012 0.048
Bias (β ) -0.031 -0.020 -0.011 -0.016 -0.018 -0.011 -0.021 -0.015 -0.011 0.001 -0.009
SE (β ) 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.011 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004
RMSE (β ) 0.032 0.021 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.012 0.023 0.016 0.012 0.004 0.010
AR(2) 6.7% 7.0% 7.5%
Sargan 5.4% 58.4% 4.1% 5.3%
MAE 0.28 0.18 0.32 0.07 0.14 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.02 0.10
Panel B: Scheme 1 with σα = 0.1 (censoring percentage of 21%)
Bias (γ) 0.160 -0.133 -0.082 -0.083 0.131 -0.006 -0.059 -0.067 -0.045 0.003 0.038
SE (γ) 0.006 0.010 0.042 0.019 0.008 0.009 0.017 0.013 0.021 0.011 0.013
RMSE (γ) 0.160 0.133 0.092 0.085 0.131 0.011 0.061 0.068 0.050 0.011 0.040
Bias (β ) -0.049 -0.043 -0.040 -0.043 -0.033 -0.034 -0.043 -0.041 -0.039 0.001 -0.033
SE (β ) 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004
RMSE (β ) 0.049 0.043 0.040 0.043 0.034 0.035 0.045 0.041 0.039 0.005 0.033
AR(2) 4.2% 4.4% 4.6%
Sargan 6.1% 100.0% 9.5% 15.3%
MAE 1.17 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.60 0.08 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.02 0.03
to be continued next page
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Table 6. The impact of fractional dependent variables (continued)
Estimators POLS FE AH-IV FD-GMM SYS-GMM LD-GMM LDP-GMM LSDVC BC DPF II
Panel C: Scheme 2 with σα = 0.05 (censoring percentage of 15%)
Bias (γ) 0.129 -0.100 -0.007 -0.022 0.095 0.030 -0.007 -0.008 0.084 0.022 0.072
SE (γ) 0.008 0.010 0.072 0.023 0.010 0.009 0.021 0.017 0.039 0.012 0.013
RMSE (γ) 0.130 0.100 0.072 0.032 0.096 0.032 0.022 0.019 0.092 0.026 0.073
Bias (β ) -0.041 -0.032 -0.027 -0.031 -0.030 -0.023 -0.031 -0.027 -0.020 -0.005 -0.021
SE (β ) 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004
RMSE (β ) 0.042 0.033 0.028 0.032 0.031 0.023 0.033 0.027 0.021 0.007 0.021
AR(2) 4.0% 4.2% 4.9%
Sargan 6.3% 87.5% 6.4% 6.9%
MAE 0.53 0.18 0.25 0.10 0.27 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.40 0.05 0.17
Panel D: Scheme 2 withσα = 0.1 (censoring percentage of 33%)
Bias (γ) 0.182 -0.116 -0.077 -0.078 0.166 0.018 -0.045 -0.052 -0.017 0.031 0.074
SE (γ) 0.005 0.010 0.038 0.020 0.008 0.009 0.016 0.014 0.020 0.012 0.012
RMSE (γ) 0.182 0.116 0.086 0.080 0.166 0.020 0.047 0.054 0.026 0.033 0.075
Bias (β ) -0.066 -0.063 -0.063 -0.067 -0.057 -0.055 -0.061 -0.060 -0.059 -0.009 -0.052
SE (β ) 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
RMSE (β ) 0.067 0.063 0.063 0.067 0.057 0.055 0.062 0.060 0.059 0.010 0.053
AR(2) 5.8% 5.8% 7.2%
Sargan 6.0% 100.0% 13.1% 16.6%
MAE 3.06 0.24 0.21 0.22 1.44 0.08 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.08
Notes: In Scheme 1 the DGP is given by (9). In Scheme 2 the DGP is given by (12). In both, the simulation parameters are set as follows:
γ = 0.8, β = 0.2, xL =−0.5, xU = 1.0, α0 = 0.1, α1 = 0.1, α2 =−0.25, and σu = 0.1. We consider the short panel (T = 10) with 400 hypothetical
companies (N = 400). We control the percentage of (doubly) censored observations outside the unit interval by varying σα . In Scheme 1 the
censoring percentages are 9% and 21%, respectively, for σα = 0.05 and 0.1. In Scheme 2 the censoring percentages are 15% and 33%, respectively,
for σα = 0.05 and 0.1. See notes to Table 1 for abbreviations.
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Table 7. Variable definitions and summary statistics
Variable N Mean Median Stdev. Min. Max.
BDR 108,139 0.2549 0.2310 0.2043 0.0000 0.9387
DEP 108,139 0.0486 0.0403 0.0358 0.0023 0.2254
EBIT 108,139 0.0239 0.0851 0.2497 -1.3312 0.3574
FA 108,139 0.3252 0.2773 0.2260 0.0086 0.9074
IND 108,139 0.2277 0.2395 0.0945 0.0000 0.6557
MB 108,139 1.5395 1.0472 1.5145 0.3076 9.9618
RD 108,139 0.0363 0.0000 0.0826 0.0000 0.5090
RDD 108,139 0.5640 1.0000 0.4959 0.0000 1.0000
SIZE 108,139 13.7966 13.7312 2.0382 9.4890 18.7517
Notes: This table reports the number of observations (N), mean, median, standard deviation
(Stdev.), minimum (Min.), and maximum (Max.) of the variables considered in the empirical
application. We follow Flannery and Rangan (2006) and define the explanatory variables as
follows. The dependent variable, book leverage (BDR), is measured by the ratio of total debt,
including debt of both long-term and short-term maturities, to total assets. Non-debt tax shields
(DEP) is the ratio of depreciation to total assets. Profitability (EBIT) is the ratio of Earnings
Before Interest and Taxes to total assets. Asset tangibility (FA) is the ratio of property, plant,
and equipment (PPE) to total assets. The industry median book leverage (IND) is calculated
based on Fama and French’s (2002) 49 industry groupings. Growth opportunities (MB) or the
market-to-book ratio is the ratio of total liabilities plus the market value of equity to total assets.
R&D expenses (RD) is the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. The R&D dummy variable
(RDD) is equal to one if the firm did not report R&D expenses and zero otherwise. Firm size
(SIZE) is the natural log of total assets, measured in 1983 dollars, where CPI is the consumer
price index (1983=100).
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Table 8. Summary of regression results for the dynamic partial adjustment model of leverage
Variable POLS FE AH-IV FD-GMM SYS-GMM LD-GMM LDP-GMM LSDVC BC DPF II
L.BDR 0.848*** 0.604*** 0.846*** 0.836*** 0.821*** 0.855*** 0.929*** 0.736*** 0.718*** 0.727*** 0.757***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) (0.050) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
EBIT -0.027*** -0.035*** 0.119*** 0.108*** 0.032*** -0.269** 0.012** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.016*** -0.032***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.109) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
MB 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002* -0.001 0.000 0.013 0.000 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DEP -0.105*** -0.152*** -0.074 -0.107* -0.036 -0.123 -0.268*** -0.185*** -0.176*** -0.169*** -0.166***
(0.017) (0.032) (0.064) (0.061) (0.027) (0.469) (0.038) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
TA 0.000 0.012*** -0.045*** -0.042*** 0.000 -0.002 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FA 0.019*** 0.034*** -0.157*** -0.138*** 0.013*** 0.003 -0.015* 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.030***
(0.002) (0.007) (0.017) (0.017) (0.004) (0.046) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
RDD 0.004*** -0.004* -0.009** -0.010** 0.007*** -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.003* -0.001 -0.003*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
RD -0.033*** -0.022 0.105*** 0.085*** 0.016 0.029 0.076*** -0.012 -0.018 0.007 -0.020*
(0.011) (0.020) (0.034) (0.033) (0.015) (0.246) (0.026) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
IND 0.080*** 0.088*** -0.223*** -0.202*** 0.067*** 0.119 -0.032** 0.094*** 0.071*** 0.083*** 0.074***
(0.006) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.009) 0.100 0.012 (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
SOA 15% 40% 15% 16% 18% 15% 7% 26% 28% 27% 24%
AR(2) test -2.21 [0.03] -2.09 [0.04] -1.59 [0.11]
Sargan test 240.72 [0.00] 394.12 [0.00] 42.7 [0.24] 138.6 [0.00]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No Yes
Observations 92,517 92,517 80,149 80,149 86,870 164 39,435 92,517 92,517 92,517 92,517
Notes: The speed of adjustment (SOA) is derived from the coefficient on lagged leverage. Variable definitions are listed in Table 7. AR(2) is a test for the null of no residual
serial correlation and Sargan is a test for the joint null of validity of the moment conditions (over-identifying restrictions). *, **, and *** indicate significance of the coefficients
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Figures in (·) are the standard errors and those in [·] are the p-values of test statistics.
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Table 9. Summary of regression results for the dynamic partial adjustment model of cash holdings
Variable POLS FE AH-IV FD-GMM SYS-GMM LD-GMM LDP-GMM LSDVC BC II
L.CASH 0.720*** 0.375*** 0.463*** 0.468*** 0.460*** 0.897*** 0.459*** 0.521*** 0.519*** 0.511***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.067) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
IND_CFASD 0.187*** 0.079*** 0.124*** 0.090*** 0.243*** -0.192 0.142*** 0.149*** 0.078*** 0.202***
(0.015) (0.021) (0.031) (0.031) (0.021) (0.132) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
MB 0.019*** 0.019*** -0.017*** -0.010* 0.042*** -0.088*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.021***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.024) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
SIZE -0.005*** -0.129*** -0.403*** -0.379*** -0.034*** 0.079 -0.154*** -0.115*** -0.106*** -0.033***
(0.002) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.004) (0.057) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
CFA 0.097*** 0.129*** -0.098 -0.122* -0.290*** 2.738** 0.180*** 0.110*** 0.117*** 0.047
(0.031) (0.041) (0.065) (0.067) (0.046) (1.309) (0.051) (0.037) (0.032) (0.033)
NWC -0.306*** -0.218*** 0.771*** 0.709*** -0.345*** 0.195 -0.109*** -0.147*** -0.184*** -0.354***
(0.019) (0.035) (0.056) (0.057) (0.033) (0.473) (0.040) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
CAPEX -1.035*** -1.073*** 0.629*** 0.600*** -0.520*** -0.109 -1.352*** -1.146*** -1.079*** -1.324***
(0.053) (0.075) (0.102) (0.104) (0.077) (2.171) (0.086) (0.075) (0.060) (0.062)
LEV -0.456*** -0.292*** 1.140*** 1.080*** -0.792*** 1.469*** -0.168*** -0.139*** -0.177*** -0.333***
(0.020) (0.035) (0.062) (0.062) (0.041) (0.504) (0.042) (0.016) (0.024) (0.025)
RDS 0.107*** 0.025** -0.039** -0.017 0.189*** 0.963** 0.021 0.005 0.013 0.019*
(0.007) (0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.395) (0.016) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
DIV -0.055*** -0.020 -0.068*** -0.061*** -0.075*** -0.115 -0.062*** -0.014 -0.021 -0.046**
(0.007) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.014) (0.160) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
MA -1.029*** -0.822*** 0.742*** 0.698*** -0.150* 1.873 -1.107*** -1.013*** -0.920*** -0.856**
(0.065) (0.070) (0.091) (0.094) (0.080) (2.018) (0.084) (0.046) (0.065) (0.068)
SOA 28% 63% 54% 53% 54% 10% 54% 48% 48% 49%
AR(2) test 3.80 [0.00] 3.68 [0.00] 5.08 [0.00]
Sargan test 694.87 [0.00] 798.14 [0.00] 27.65 [0.73] 24.53 [0.00]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Observations 107,554 107,554 90,263 90,263 100,098 102 60,758 107,554 107,554 107,554
Notes: The speed of adjustment (SOA) is derived from the coefficient on the lagged cash. Our variable definitions strictly follow BKS; summary statistics are not reported but
are available on request. AR(2) is a test for the null of no residual serial correlation and Sargan is a test for the joint null of validity of the moment conditions (over-identifying
restrictions). *, **, and *** indicate significance of the coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Figures in (·) are the standard errors and those in [·] are the
p-values of test statistics.
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Internet Appendix for “In search of robust methods for dynamic panel data models in
empirical corporate finance”
Here we provide details of our estimation algorithms for the BC and II estimators, deriva-
tions of the formulas used in our simulations in Section 3 of the paper, and additional Monte
Carlo simulation studies on leverage processes generated under random financing.
1. Estimation algorithm for BC
Consider the dynamic panel data ARDL(1,0) model:
yit = γyi,t−1+β ′xit +ηi + vit , i = 1, . . . ,N; t = 2, . . . ,T. (A.1)
Using the FE estimator eliminates the fixed effect, ηi, in (A.1) via the within-group transfor-
mation:
y˜it = γ y˜i,t−1+β ′x˜it + v˜it , (A.2)
where y˜it , y˜i,t−1, x˜it , and v˜it are the deviations from the variables’ respective individual means.
Next, let pˆi be the FE estimator of pi =(γ,β )′ from (A.2). Then, for a fixed T , we haveE [pˆi] 6= pi .
The bootstrap-based estimator, BC, corrects for the finite-sample bias of the FE estimator
in the following way. First, suppose that we generate a sequence of L biased FE estimates,
pˆi(1) (pi) , ..., pˆi(L) (pi), by means of repeated sampling experiments. It then follows that







pˆi(ℓ) (pi) , (A.3)







pˆi(ℓ) (p¯i) . (A.4)
Hence, if we sample repeatedly from a population with parameters p¯i , and estimate pˆi(ℓ) (p¯i)
in each sample, then p¯i is an unbiased estimator of pi if the average of pˆi(ℓ) (p¯i) corresponds to
the FE estimate, pˆi , based on the original data. That is, a bias-corrected estimate of pi can be
1
obtained by searching over the parameter space until a p¯i is found that satisfies (A.4). This is
implemented using a bootstrap procedure, as detailed below:





and the residuals, v˜= (v˜′1, ..., v˜
′
N)
′= y˜−Z˜pˆi(0), where pˆi(0) is the FE estimate based on the origi-
nal data, D= IN⊗
(
IT−1− 1T−1 ιT−1ι ′T−1
)
is an idempotent transformation matrix that removes























































where mit is the {(i−1)(T −1)+(t−1)}th diagonal element of the idempotent matrix, M =
IN(T−1)−D′Z(Z′DZ)−1Z′D.
Step 2: We generate the bth bootstrap sample residual, denoted v˜(b), from the rescaled







(0)xit + ηˆi + v˜
∗(b)
it , t = 2, . . . ,T ;b = 1, ...,B, (A.6)
where we use y
(b)








































































Step 4: We define the difference between pˆi(0) and p¯i(0) as d(0) = pˆi(0)− p¯i(0). If sup
∣∣d(0)∣∣=
0, then pˆi(0) will be an unbiased estimator of pi according to condition (A.4). Otherwise, we
update pˆi(k+1) = pˆi(k)+d(k) for k ≥ 0.
We iterate the bootstrap procedure outlined in Steps 1 - 4 until condition (A.4) is satisfied.
Following Everaert and Pozzi (2007), we set the number of bootstrap samples B to 1000. We
use the convergence criterion, sup
∣∣d(k)∣∣ < 0.005 and set the upper bound on the number of
iterations at k = 20. We use the FE estimate based on the original data for pˆi(0).
Alternative resampling schemes. Resampling v˜(b) in a non-parametric way, as described above,
has the advantage that it does not require a distributional assumption for v. Here, we consider










, i = 1, ...,N, (A.8)
where the vectors of the indices (i1, ..., iN) and (t2, ..., tT ) are obtained by drawing randomly
with replacement from (1, ...,N)′ and (2, ...,T )′, respectively. Second, if we allow vit to exhibit
temporal dependence (e.g., conditional heteroskedasticity), we resample it by using the wild











, i = 1, ...,N, (A.9)
where the index j is drawn with replacement from (1, ...,N)′, and τit is a binomial random
variable (with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1) that takes the values -1 and 1 with equal
probability, 0.5. This is asymptotically valid as either T , N or both become sufficiently large.










2. Estimation algorithm for II
Gouriéroux et al. (2010) develop the II method for the AR(1) model. They show how to
use simulations to approximate the binding function and then obtain an unbiased estimate by
taking the inverse of this binding function. A similar procedure can be applied to a model
with multiple regressors, although it is more complicated and the associated computation time
increases exponentially. In our paper, while we only consider two parameters in the Monte
Carlo simulations, we estimate nine to eleven parameters in the empirical applications.
Recall the dynamic panel data model under consideration:
yit = γyi,t−1+β ′xit +ηi + vit , i = 1, . . . ,N; t = 1, . . . ,T. (A.10)
Following Gouriéroux et al. (2000) we propose an II estimator using MLE (FE) as the baseline





the vector of parameters with the parameter space, Θ⊂ Rk+1. First, we estimate the model by
FE and obtain the (biased) estimate, θˆ . We then use simulations to obtain an unbiased estimate
of θ that satisfies:
θˆ II = argmin
θ∈Θ
∥∥θˆ −bNT (θ)∥∥ , (A.11)
where bNT (θ) is the binding function defined by









(θ) is the FE obtained from the h-th simulated path, y˜hit in (A.13) below.
To generate the h-th simulated path of the DGPs given the parameter vector, θ , we calibrate
it by






it , h = 1, ...,H, (A.13)
where variables with tilde are the deviations from their respective individual means, e.g., y˜it =
yit − y¯i with y¯i = 1T ∑Tt=1 yit . Without the loss of generality we assume that x˜it is exogenous and
the within transformation eliminates the individual effect, ηi from (A.10). Hence, the simulated
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path in (A.13) can be generated simply by drawing v˜hit parametrically or nonparametrically. To
this end we first obtain the residuals from the initial estimation:
ˆ˜vit = y˜it − γˆ y˜it − βˆ ′x˜it , (A.14)
and compute the variance, σˆ2v˜ . Then, we draw v˜
h
it from a normal distribution with a mean of








θ˜ (θ) . (A.15)
In principle, θˆ II can be obtained by minimizing the quadratic distance measure as










where W is a positive definite weighting matrix. However, due to dimensionality, the above
algorithm would be computationally demanding. Hence, we follow a simpler algorithm pro-
posed by Gouriéroux et al. (2000), who observe that the objective function is (approximately)
linear, and further assume that it holds in the multidimensional case, see also Phillips (2012)
for the stationary case. Thus, we consider the following numerical optimization:






, for n = 0,1,2... (A.17)
Starting from the (biased) initial estimate, θˆ , we iterate the algorithm until the following con-
vergence criterion is satisfied: ∥∥bNT (θ)− θˆ∥∥≤ c, (A.18)
where c is a small positive number.
To implement the above II procedure, we make three choices regarding the number of
simulated paths, the estimation criterion, and the distribution of the data used for simulation.
The first and the second choices are trivial. Gouriéroux et al. (2010) show that the II estimator
can correct the bias and reduce the standard error effectively and simultaneously using a small
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number of simulated paths (e.g., 10). In this study, we set the number of simulated paths to 50.
Further, we also choose the estimation criterion in a flexible manner, depending on the baseline
estimator used (e.g., MLE and GMM). The third choice is a more important one. It is crucial to
calibrate the sampling distribution so that it can be close to the true DGP, although the latter is
generally unknown. Gouriéroux et al. (2010) suggest using the auxiliary model to calibrate the
simulated path of the data, in which case the number of parameters is the same in both models.
We also follow this approach here and summarize our estimation algorithm in four steps below.
Step 1: We estimate the residuals, v˜it = y˜it − γˆ(0)y˜i,t−1− βˆ
′




is the FE estimate based on the original data. Next using the residuals, we estimate the variance
of v˜it , i.e., σˆ
2
v .
Step 2: We generate the hth sample path of yit using v˜
h
it drawn from a normal distribution







it , h = 1, ...,H, (A.19)
where we use y˜hi1 = βˆ
′





, using y˜hit and x˜it .
























∥∥bˆNT (θˆ (0))− θˆ (0)∥∥.
If d(0) = 0, then θˆ (0) will be an unbiased estimator of θ . Otherwise, we update






, for n = 0,1,2... (A.21)
We iterate the algorithm outlined in Steps 1 - 4 until the convergence criterion in (A.18) is
satisfied. We initially set λ = 1. For some simulated paths, however, the estimator tends to be
close to the frontier of the set, bNT (Θ) such that the algorithm fails to converge. In such a case
we switch to λ = 0.2, as recommended by Gouriéroux et al. (2000).
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3. Derivations of the formulas used in the DGP in the simulation experiments
3.1. Derivation of Var (zi) and Cov(xit ,zi)
First, the covariance between xit and zi can be expressed as
Cov(xit ,zi) =Cov(xit , x¯i)−Cov(xit , x¯) .
Using x¯i = T
−1∑Ts=1 xis, it is easily seen that









Next, using x¯ = N−1∑Ni=1 x¯i, and noticing that Cov
(
xit , x¯ j
)
= 0 for i 6= j, we have:
Cov(xit , x¯) = N































































the variance of zi is given by











Var (x¯i) . (A.23)
7
The variance of x¯i = T
−1∑Tt=1 xit is then given by













































After some tedious, but otherwise straightforward, algebra, we finally obtain:










3.2. Derivation of ϕit and ψit







1− γ ηi, (A.25)
where L is a lag operator. Replacing xit and vit in (A.25) with
xit =
1




yit = βϕit +ψit +
ηi
1− γ , (A.26)
where ϕit =
1
(1−γL)(1−ρL)ξit and ψit =
1
(1−γL)(1−φL)εit can be expressed as two mutually inde-
pendent stationary AR(2) processes:
ϕit = (γ +ρ)ϕi,t−1− γρϕi,t−2+ξit , (A.27)
ψit = (γ +φ)ψi,t−1− γφψi,t−2+ εit . (A.28)
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3.3. Derivation of the variance of the signal, σ2s
The variance of sit = wit − vit is defined as
Var (wit − vit) =Var (wit)+Var (vit)−2Cov(wit ,vit)





Cov(ψit ,vit) =Var (vit)+ γCov(vit ,vi,t−1) =Var (vit)+ γφVar (vit) = (1+ γφ)Var (vit) .
Thus,
σ2s = β




















































3.4. Derivation of the initial conditions























Var (ϕit) = σ
2
ξ [1− (γ +ρ)Corr (ϕit ,ϕi,t−1)+ γρCorr (ϕit ,ϕi,t−2)]−1 ,





















Var (ψit) = σ
2
ε [1− (γ +φ)Corr (ψit ,ψi,t−1)+ γφCorr (ψit ,ψi,t−2)]−1 ,




Corr (ψit ,ψi,t−2) = (γ +φ)Corr (ψit ,ψi,t−1)− γφ .
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4. Simulation in the presence of random financing choices
Chang and Dasgupta (2009) examine the dynamics of corporate capital structure using sim-
ulated data, where firms are assumed to follow a random type of financing to offset their financ-
ing deficit, kit : firms issue debt and equity with probabilities p and 1− p, respectively. We now
examine the performance of each estimator in an additional simulation in which the leverage
processes are generated on the basis of this type of random financing. As in Chang and Das-















yit wtih probability 1− p
, i = 1, . . . ,N; t = 0, . . . ,T −1. (A.36)
We then extend Chang and Dasgupta’s (2009) simulation design in two important ways. First,
to be consistent with the main simulations in Section 3 of our paper, we incorporate the firm















yit +ηi + vi,t+1 wtih probability 1− p
, i= 1, . . . ,N; t = 0, . . . ,T−1.
(A.37)
Second, while Chang and Dasgupta (2009) fix kit , we relax this strong restriction and allow
for heterogeneity in kit across firms via several experiments: we draw kit from the uniform
distribution across firms and over time.
For simplicity, in (A.37), we let p = 0.5. That is, the firm’s financial decision is determined
by a coin toss. In our simulations, we estimate the following AR(1) model:
yi,t+1 = γyit +ηi + vi,t+1, i = 1, . . . ,N; t = 0, . . . ,T −1, (A.38)
where we set (N,T ) = (500,10) and use 1,000 replications. We further set yi0 = 0 but discard
the first 10 years of observations to reduce the effect of the initial values. We draw vi,t+1 from
the standard normal distribution, and ηi from the uniform distribution, U (−a,a), for a > 0. To
control for the loading factor, µ,we set a=
√
3µ . Then we let µ = 1 and so a=
√
3. That is, we
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draw ηi from U
(−√3,√3). Note that, from (A.37), the AR(1) coefficient is γ = 1/(1+ kit).1
Table A.1 below presents the results of three simulation experiments. First, as in Chang
and Dasgupta (2009), we simply fix kit at 0.15 for all firm-year observations (the choice of
kit = 0.15 corresponds to the empirical mean of the financing deficit ratio). Then, the true
AR(1) coefficient is 1/(1+0.15) ≈ 0.870. The results contained in the first row suggest that
AH-IV produces the most accurate estimate of the AR(1) coefficient, γ , although LD-GMM,
LDP-GMM, LSDVC, BC, II, and FD-GMM also perform reasonably well. However, DPF,
SYS-GMM, and POLS generate a moderate to large amount of upward bias, while FE produces
a substantial amount of downward bias.
Second, we allow kit to vary across firms and over time. To do so, we draw kit from
U (0,0.3). The AR(1) coefficient is thus equal to E [1/(1+ kit)] ≈ 0.875.2 We find that the
results, reported in the second row, are very similar to those documented for the first experi-
ment.
In the third and final experiment, we allow for both issuing and retiring/repurchasing deci-
sions. That is, the firm issues debt (or retires it if kit < 0) with probability p, and issues equity
(or repurchases it if kit < 0) with probability 1− p, where p = 0.5. Specifically, we generate
values from kit ∼U (−0.2,0.2) and find that in this case E [1/(1+ kit)]≈ 1.014. The results in
the third row show that AH-IV, FD-, LD-, LDP-GMM, LSDVC, and BC have negligible bias,
while DPF, SYS-GMM, and POLS also perform reasonably well.
In sum, our simulation experiments show that AH-IV is the most favorable method, while
LD-GMM, LDP-GMM, LSDVC, and BC are also acceptable. In contrast, DPF generally has
1Unlike EF, we show that in the random financing simulation, the SOA should not be equal to zero. This
is because, by construction, the true SOA is δ = kit/(1+ kit), meaning the SOA would only be equal to zero
in a hypothetical scenario where the firm did not have any financing deficit, i.e., kit = 0, and leverage was a
non-stationary process, i.e., γ = 1.


















































where kit ∼U (l,u).
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non-negligible (upward) bias, and is always outperformed by these estimators. Unlike in Elsas
and Florysiak (2014), our simulation results suggest that no estimator can help researchers to
distinguish between real target adjustment behavior and mechanical mean reversion caused by
random financing.
Additional references
Goncalves, S., and L. Kilian. 2004. Bootstrapping autoregressions with conditional het-
eroskedasticity of unknown form. Journal of Econometrics 123: 89-120.
MacKinnon, J.G. 2002. Bootstrap inference in econometrics. Canadian Journal of Economics
35: 615-645.
Phillips, P.C.B. 2012. Folklore theorems, implicit maps and indirect inference. Econometrica
80: 425-454.
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POLS FE AH-IV FD-GMM SYS-GMM LD-GMM LDP-GMM LSDVC BC DPF II
kit = 0.15 0.870 0.137 -0.239 0.005 -0.054 0.106 0.012 0.026 -0.020 -0.048 0.074 0.043
kit ∼U (0,0.3) 0.875 0.131 -0.243 0.005 -0.051 0.099 0.017 0.027 -0.023 -0.048 0.064 0.042
kit ∼U (−0.2,0.2) 1.014 0.050 -0.116 0.000 0.001 0.048 -0.001 0.000 0.006 0.004 0.034 0.089
Notes: This table reports the performance of each estimator when the leverage processes (DGPs) are generated according to random financing (A.37).
E [1/(1+ kit)] is the true AR(1) coefficient. kit is the financing deficit divided by total assets. The performance of each estimator is evaluated by the bias
of the AR(1) coefficient estimate (γˆ).
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